Weston County Courthouse, Newcastle Wyoming

This is the Weston County Courthouse in Newcastle, Weston County, Wyoming. If this well preserved courthouse is not the oldest operating courthouse in the state, it must be very close to the oldest one still in use. The courthouse houses a courtroom of the 6th Judicial District, which also has a courthouse in Gillette, Wyoming.

Campbell County Courthouse, Gillette Wyoming

This is the Campbell County Courthouse in Gillette Wyoming. The courthouse has been recently added on to, but the additions match so well that it is not really possible to tell. The court houses the district and circuit courts for Wyoming's Eighth Judicial District.

Campbell County's war memorial is located on the same block as the courthouse.

Fremont County Courthouse, Lander Wyoming

This is the Fremont County Courthouse in Lander Wyoming. The courthouse includes all of the administrative offices of Fremont County as well as housing two courtrooms for the Ninth Judicial District, which also has courtrooms in Pinedale Wyoming and Jackson Hole Wyoming.

The courthouse lawn has a nice memorial to all war veterans from Fremont County since statehood, naming them in the memorial.

Federal Courthouse, Lander Wyoming

This is the Federal Courthouse in Lander Wyoming, however it hasn't been used in that capacity in many years. The building is leased out by the Federal government, and chances are that most people, even in Lander, are not aware that this is a courthouse or that it has a courtroom.

I once had a case, about fifteen years ago, in which it was briefly suggested that the trial could be held in the courtroom, when this building was then under lease to the National Outdoor Leadership School, but the suggestion was quickly rejected on the basis that the courtroom had not been used as one in many years, and that it was too small.

A note on the photography

All the photographs here are in the nature of subjects of opportunity. I wanted to note that, as a lot of them are taken in poor light conditions, and are less than ideal in terms of their quality.

As in many instances the courthouses photographed here are ones that I rarely will encounter again, if ever, I take the photos when they present themselves. In terms of artwork, therefore, they aren't always so great.

Also, as those who have examined any photograph taken prior to the current date will note, many of these photographs were taken in the long regional winter of 2010-2011, so the weather they were taken in was dreary.

Denver City and County Building, Denver Colorado

These photographs depict the Denver City and County Building. This building was built to contain courtrooms, and at one time included city and county courtrooms. I do not know which, if any, courtrooms remain in the building.

Federal District Courthouse, Denver Colorado

This is a Federal District Courthouse in Denver Colorado. I generally do not know much about this courthouse, other than that it is across the street from the Byron White Courthouse and the Bankruptcy Courthouse.

United States Bankruptcy Court, Denver Colorado

This is the Federal Bankruptcy Courthouse in Denver, which also indicates that it is the Custom's House. I otherwise know nothing about this particular building, other than that it is next to the Federal District Courthouse in Denver, and across the corner from the Byron White Courthouse.

Byron White Courthouse, Denver Colorado

This is the Byron White Courthouse in Denver Colorado, the courthouse of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals.

This is a really impressive structure, taking up an entire city block. Built in the Greek Revival style heavily associated with Federal Courthouses, it bears the somewhat disturbing message depicted above. The courthouse was built during the years 1910 to 1916, and of course was renamed for Byron White, who had played football prior at CU, prior to his legal career.

Weld County Courthouse, Greeley Colorado

This is the Weld County Courthouse, in Greeley Colorado. It is part of the 19th Judicial District in Colorado.

I don't really know much about this courthouse, although I once took a deposition in it in a Wyoming case. It is an impressive classic courthouse. I recall it as having a huge central staircase.

Natrona County Hall of Justice

Fairly typical example of modern multi purpose courthouse. This building housed the Natrona County Court, later the 7th Judicial District Circuit Court, and the City of Casper Court, from some point in the 1970s until recently. Now only the City of Casper Court is located here. Administrative offices for various county law enforcement agencies are also located here.

The back of the old Natrona County Courthouse can be seen to the right of the photograph.

Only city court is now held here, so if you are reporting for jury duty here, it has to be only for a city court trial. District court and circuit court is elsewhere.

Ewing T. Kerr Federal Courthouse, Casper Wyoming

This is another Depression Era Wyoming courthouse, although it's roots are to be found in the era of oil fueled economic expansion that started during World War One. Funding for the courthouse came from a 1926 appropriations act that funded a variety of courthouses around the nation. The cornerstone, however, was set in 1931 and the courthouse completed in 1932.

This courthouse actually has seen as much use as a post office as it has as a courthouse. The original building housed all of the principal Federal offices in Casper, Wyoming, including the post office (my father worked there in the mid 1940s). A courtroom was a feature of the building, but the concept of a Federal courthouse was somewhat different at the time. There was no sitting Federal judge and the courtroom was instead simply available for a Federal judge, the concept being that the single Federal judge in Cheyenne would need to travel to outlying towns and cities to hear cases. There were also Federal courthouses, in this era, in Green River, Lander, and Yellowstone National Park. This courthouse also housed such Federal employees as the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps recruiters.

In the 1970s the post office moved to a new large Federal building that was built some blocks away. At that time, the enormous Depression era murals that were in the building were removed and reinstalled in the new post office. The mail boxes, which dominated the first floor, were also moved. A few Federal offices remained in the building, however, such as the United States Geological Survey which I briefly worked for in the 1980s.

By the late 1980s Wyoming's Federal Courts had expanded to the point where there were then three sitting Federal judges, all in Cheyenne. This then lead to the view that it was time to relocate one of the judges to Casper. The courthouse was remodeled in the late 80s with this in mind, and it is now a purpose designated courthouse, with offices limited to the judiciary or the U.S. Attorneys. The Federal District Court courtroom is widely regarded as one of the most attractive in Wyoming, and a second smaller courtroom, used principally by the Bankruptcy Court, is also well appointed, if quite small.

The building obtained its current name after the remodeling, and it is now named for longtime late Federal Judge, Ewing T. Kerr.

If you are summoned to a Federal (not state) jury in Casper, Wyoming, this is where you go.

Federal Courthouse, as viewed from my office in the Consolidated Royalty Building.

Natrona County Courthouse

This is a courthouse with no courtrooms, at least it no longer has any receiving that use.

This Great Depression era courthouse originally housed the 7th Judicial District and Natrona County courts. In later years, however, the district court's growth meant that the county court moved into an adjoining building, and the district court used a large and small courtroom. In the last decade, however, the addition of a third district court judge meant there was no longer sufficient room for the district court, and the Townsend Hotel was remodeled into a courthouse, as depicted below. Today this courthouse is used for county offices.

This courthouse does feature one very large, and beautiful, 1930s vintage courtroom. The jury box was uniquely cast at an angle, so the jury sat facing the witnesses and the judge. Unlike almost every other courtroom, the opposing parties sat essentially side by side, on the same side of the courtroom. Off hand, it's the only courtroom configured in this style I can recall.

The small courtroom was a dismal affair, being very tiny. It was nice looking, having been obviously built at the same time the county court had been moved to new quarters, but it was entirely too small, even though it could accommodate a very cramped jury.

This building was built by the WPA and features a number of bas reliefs depicting the history of the region.

Do not go here for jury duty, if you live in Natrona County and are summoned to jury duty. This building no longer functions as a courthouse. Go instead to the Townsend Justice Center if you are reporting for district court or circuit court jury duty.

Niobrara County Courthouse, Lusk Wyoming

For the first post on this blog, here is the Niobrara County Courthouse in Lusk, Wyoming. It's one of the oldest still used courthouses in Wyoming, in the classic style of it's period, having been built in 1919. It has been remodeled since then.

I've tried a case in this courthouse many years ago, in December. Unfortunately, the courtroom lacked heat at the time, so it was memorable for more than one reason. Likewise, many years ago I argued a motion hearing in the courthouse mid summer, when the only cooling in chambers, where the argument was held, was provided by a desk fan.

The courthouses is the home of Niobrara County's business offices, the Niobrara County Circuit Court, and the 8th Judicial District court in Niobrara County.

Lex Anteinternet: Pinnacle Bank v. Villa, 2004 WY 150, 100 P.3d 1287...

Lex Anteinternet: Pinnacle Bank v. Villa, 2004 WY 150, 100 P.3d 1287...: This  case is interesting for a couple of reasons.  On one hand, it firmly established that the fault of immune parties may be compared...

Young v. HAC, LLC, 24 P.3d 1142 (Wyo. 2001)

Jason A. YOUNG, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

HAC, LLC d/b/a Benham’s, Appellee (Defendant).

No. 00–187. | May 31, 2001.

Frank R. Chapman and Thomas A. Valdez of Beech Street Law Office, Casper, WY, for Appellant.

Patrick T. Holscher of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, Casper, WY, for Appellee.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

Opinion

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶ 1] In this personal injury action, Appellant Jason A. Young (Young) alleged Appellee HAC, LLC (HAC), negligently caused the personal injuries that Young suffered when assaulted by another customer while both patronized HAC’s business. A jury returned a verdict finding that HAC was not negligent. During trial, Young had attempted to enter into evidence the sworn statement of the customer who had assaulted Young and caused his injuries. Young appeals the jury verdict alleging that the trial court erred when it ruled that the assaulting customer’s sworn statement was hearsay that was inadmissible as a statement against interest, W.R.E. 804(b)(3), or under the catchall exception, W.R.E. 804(b)(6). We hold that the trial court did not err in ruling the sworn statement inadmissible.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Young presents this sole issue for our review:

1. Did the District Court commit reversible error by barring the sworn statement of Travis Kidd to be admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule?

HAC believes the issue is:

Is a sworn statement by an assailant admissible in its entirety under W.R.E. 804(b)(3) or W.R.E. 804(b)(6) when that assailant has already been sentenced for the assault and when the party taking the statement intentionally chooses not to preserve the assailant’s testimony for trial through a deposition?

FACTS

[¶ 3] HAC operates a restaurant and tavern called Benhams. On February 18, 1995, Young and friends were at Benhams to hear a band. Travis Kidd was also there with his girlfriend and friends. Kidd, apparently upset with his girlfriend, was disruptive, abusive, and threatening. After telling his group that he was going to hit the next person that walked by, Kidd attacked Young as Young walked by on his way out of the establishment, severely injuring him. Kidd was charged with and sentenced for aggravated assault.

[¶ 4] On March 7, 1997, Young filed suit against HAC, and HAC filed cross-claims against Kidd. Trial was set for May 24, 1999. HAC’s suit against Kidd was dismissed in January of 1998. Kidd gave a sworn statement to Young’s attorney on July 8, 1997. Although Kidd’s attorney was present during the making of the sworn statement, HAC’s attorney had not been notified and was not present. The civil trial was rescheduled for March 13, 2000, and on February 24, 2000, Young issued a trial subpoena for Kidd. Kidd could not be located, and the subpoena was not served.

[¶ 5] On March 10, 2000, Young notified HAC that Kidd was unavailable as a witness and Young intended to read Kidd’s sworn statement into evidence at trial. HAC objected, and, on March 14, after trial had begun, the trial court heard oral arguments on the issue. Ruling from the bench, the court analyzed the application of W.R.E. 804(b)(3) and (6), and found it relevant that Young had failed to take Kidd’s deposition. The trial court denied admission of the sworn statement. The jury returned a verdict finding HAC had not been negligent. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

^{[1] [2] [3]} [¶ 6] Admission of evidence, including the admission of hearsay, is within the sound discretion of the trial court; we will not disturb evidentiary rulings unless the appellant demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion. Brown v. Michael Pryor, M.D., P.C., 954 P.2d 1349, 1350 (Wyo.1998).

[T]he core of our inquiry must reach “the question of reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court.” Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998). “Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.” Id. (quoting Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash.App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236, 1238 (1985)); Basolo, 907 P.2d [348] at 353 [Wyo. 1995]. We must ask ourselves whether the district court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.

Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Wyo.2000).

W.R.E. 804

[¶ 7] W.R.E. 804 states in relevant part:

(a) Definition of unavailability.—“Unavailability as a witness” includes situations in which the declarant:

* * * *

(5) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means.

* * * *

*1145 (b) Hearsay exceptions.—The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

* * * *

(3) Statement Against Interest.—A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

* * * *

(6) Other Exceptions.—A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.

[¶ 8] Young contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider Kidd’s exposure to civil liability when assessing the evidence as a statement against interest and when it decided that the statement did not meet the trustworthiness requirements of W.R.E. 804(b)(6), the catchall exception. HAC contends that although the court properly ruled on the merits, Young’s failure to depose Kidd precludes admission of a sworn statement that has not been subject to cross-examination. We first address W.R.E. 804’s availability requirement.

A. Availability

[¶ 9] Compliance with W.R.E. 804(a) is required before the hearsay exceptions of W.R.E. 804(b) can be applied. We will not determine if the substantive requirements of W.R.E. 804(b) were met, unless the threshold eligibility of the unavailability request is demonstrated. Williams v. Collins Communications, Inc., 720 P.2d 880, 886 (Wyo.1986). In its ruling from the bench, the trial court did not decide whether Young’s attempts to subpoena Kidd complied with W.R.E. 804(a), and, because we affirm on other grounds, we need not consider the issue on our own. The trial court did consider Young’s failure to depose Kidd as a factor that weighed against admitting the sworn statement under either of the two exceptions.

^[4] [¶ 10] Under the federal rules, an obligation to obtain a deposition exists pursuant to F.R.E 804(a)(5), which states:

(a) Definition of unavailability. “Unavailability as a witness” includes situations in which the declarant-

* * * *

(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant’s attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.

(emphasis added). See also United States v. Olafson, 213 F.3d 435, 442 n. 3 (9th Cir.2000). Federal courts interpret the emphasized phrase as requiring an attempt to depose a witness, or the court will not find the witness is unavailable and consider admission under the the exceptions in subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4). Under Wyoming’s rules, W.R.E. 804(a)(5) no longer includes this phrase, and we need not consider whether Young had an obligation to depose Kidd before attempting to introduce his statement under W.R.E. 804(b)(3). We agree, however, that the lack of opportunity for cross-examination such as would have been available by deposition may *1146 be a factor the trial court can properly consider for admitting statements under the catchall exception, W.R.E. 804(b)(6). Although deposition testimony is also considered hearsay, it may be admissible under either the rules of civil procedure or W.R.E. 804(b)(1). Brown, 954 P.2d at 1351.

B. W.R.E. 804(b)(3), Statement Against Interest

^[5] [¶ 11] Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” W.R.E. 801(c). A “statement” is an oral or written assertion or nonverbal conduct intended as an assertion. W.R.E. 801(a). The word “statement” means “a single declaration or remark,” rather than “a report or narrative,” so that when ruling on the admissibility of a narrative, we must break down the narrative and determine the separate admissibility of each “single declaration or remark.” State v. Phillips, 194 W.Va. 569, 461 S.E.2d 75, 91 (1995); see Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 2434–35, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994) (discussing hearsay in the context of F.R.E. 804(b)(3) exception for statements against interest).

Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1245–46 (Wyo.1996).

^[6] [¶ 12] Here, Young presented Kidd’s lengthy sworn statement to be read into evidence, and the trial court determined that because it contained a number of statements describing what other people believed and saw, it was inadmissible for lack of foundation. Our review indicates that the record supports the trial court’s view that nearly all of the sworn statement, which is well over twenty-five pages, primarily consists of statements that are not statements against interest, but are inadmissible narrative.

[¶ 13] Considering the admissibility of each “single declaration or remark” as we must, we do see that Kidd admits that he assaulted Young; however, as Young acknowledges, Kidd admitted it after he had been tried and convicted for that crime. Consequently, the only liability at stake was civil liability. Young contends that the HAC’s pending cross-claim against Kidd qualifies the entire statement as admissible as a statement against interest. HAC contends that Kidd, having already admitted to criminal liability, which then became a matter of public record, did not increase his civil liability, but, instead, was actually attempting to enter an exculpatory statement. See Johnson v. State, 930 P.2d 358 (Wyo.1996).

[¶ 14] The record shows that the trial court received and considered written memorandum supporting each parties’ arguments and heard oral argument. Having considered written and oral argument, the trial court determined that the sworn statement was not a statement against interest and ruled it was inadmissible hearsay. Our review indicates that the record supports the decision to exclude the entire sworn statement. Although a single statement within the entire statement was an admission that he attacked Young, Kidd provided the entire statement to exculpate himself from liability, and it is not admissible under W.R.E. 804(b)(3), the statement against interest exception.

C. W.R.E. 804(b)(6), the Catchall Exception

^{[7] [8]} [¶ 15] Young contends that this statement met all requirements for admission. HAC contends that Young failed to give HAC adequate notice that it intended to introduce the statement under this exception, failed to prove unavailability, and the trial court properly ruled the sworn statement did not possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. We have identified the following as requirements for admission under W.R.E. 804(b)(6):

First, the declarant must be unavailable. Second, the adverse party must either have been given pretrial notice or a sufficient opportunity to prepare for and contest the admission of the hearsay. Third, the truth of the matter asserted must be evidence of a material fact. Fourth, the hearsay statement must be more probative than any other evidence which could be procured through reasonable efforts. Fifth, and finally, the statement must be supported by circumstantial guarantees of *1147 trustworthiness; this may be established either through other corroborating evidence or by considering the motivation and/or behavior pattern of the declarant.

Johnson, 930 P.2d at 366 (quoting Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 131–32 (Wyo.1981)).

[¶ 16] The record shows that the trial court did not admit this statement because of insufficient notice, and decided it failed trustworthiness requirements. Because our review of the sworn statement indicates that it was neither worthy of trust nor necessary to effectuate justice, we need not decide whether the trial court properly decided the notice issue.

^[9] [¶ 17] W.R.E. 804(b)(6) applies only in rare and exceptional circumstances. Here, the trial court was concerned about the lack of opportunity to cross-examine a hearsay statement that lacked foundation for its numerous statements about what other people saw and what Kidd believed HAC employees knew and had seen. It properly considered that Kidd was available for a deposition that would have provided the opportunity for cross-examination, and we would note that if Kidd’s testimony was crucial to this case, Young should have deposed him. These factors are sufficient reason to deny admission. We find no abuse of discretion.

[¶ 18] We affirm the trial court’s decision to exclude Kidd’s sworn statement.